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Abstract. The increase in non-performing loans around the world has had quite a nega-
tive impact on many nations’ banking systems. To address these problems, many creative 
regulatory solutions and well-designed risk techniques have been utilized in the hope of 
reducing non-performing loans to an acceptable level. The purpose of this study is to ap-
ply a newly developed data envelopment analysis model to suggest the most efficient plan 
(called Plan 4) to reduce non-performing loans that can maximize the efficiency of the 
entire banking industry’s control over the bad debts. For comparison purpose, three other 
reduction plans are also represented. The four plans are presented using data from Tai-
wan’s banking industry. The empirical results show that among the plans presented, Plan 4 
shows the most effective allocation of the industry-wide reduction target. The plan focuses 
on a finite number of banks, helping identify the key units to improve industry-wide ef-
ficiency. The findings implicitly suggest that the regulator should devise more incentive 
measures to encourage target banks to perform the non-performing loan reduction task. 
Our results also suggest that for the regulator, forcing banks to cut their non-performing 
loans by the same ratio will not help improve the relative efficiency of the industry.
Keywords: banking industry, non-performing loan, risk management; data envelopment 
analysis, undesirable output, Taiwan.
JEL Classification: C44, C61, D24, G21.
Introduction
The global financial crisis has, since its onset in 2008, taken a toll on the world econo-
my. Accompanying the crisis has been a severe contraction in economic activity. Finan-
cial institutions facing the crisis generally have exhibited unsafe and unsound practices. 
As a result, the quality of loan portfolios has deteriorated significantly, causing an 
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) and sizeable profit reduction in banking sys-
tems. Because of their rising volume and their impact on the economy as a whole, on 
the banking system and on its credit supply, NPLs have been an increasingly hot topic 
in the international scene (Scardovi 2016).
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To control NPLs, the implementation of a well-designed risk management framework 
has been considered a must for a best-practice bank. To decide whether to approve a 
loan application, banks should evaluate the riskiness of the loan, decide an appropri-
ate risk premium on the loan, devise measures to prevent as well as deal with possible 
loss events, and assess their ability to absorb losses when NPLs occur. Putting such a 
framework into practice would be expected to increase operational efficiency. If the risk 
management framework does not work, a plan for the reduction of NPLs is necessary.
Two interesting issues arise during the process. The first one is the role of NPLs in ef-
ficiency analysis and their impact on operational efficiency, which have drawn much 
attention from academic researchers. To investigate the problems, earlier studies gen-
erally used a two-stage approach. First, they estimated bank efficiency, and then used 
regression techniques, in which NPLs are an explanatory variable, to analyze the impact 
of the NPLs on efficiency. A general conclusion is that NPLs had a negative effect on 
efficiency (see e.g. Mester 1996; Berger, DeYoung 1997). The two-stage approach, how-
ever, does not include NPLs in efficiency estimation models. Assaf et al. (2013) argued 
that, in this way, the resulting efficiency scores are biased. The efficiency measure may 
overestimate a bank’s performance if it produces a high percentage of NPLs, and under-
estimate those producing less. Fujii et al. (2014) also argued that neglecting NPLs will 
fail to credit a bank for its effort to deal with the undesirable outputs. A banking produc-
tion process must be clearly defined based on both desirable and undesirable outputs.
The second issue is how to reduce NPLs. Research on this topic has generally studied 
the effect of creative regulatory solutions or management programs on the control over 
NPLs. For example, Erdinç and Gurov (2016) examine whether the implementation of 
advanced risk management techniques in compliance with the internal ratings-based 
approaches in the Basel Capital Accord reduced NPLs. Saha et al. (2016) propose a 
knowledge-driven automated compliance auditing scheme for the processing of loans 
to investigate whether loan applications are highly risky. Stijepović (2014) recommends 
a project called the Podgorica Approach for quantitative assessment of the recovery of 
NPLs which could return to performing status through a restructuring process. Other 
studies seek solutions to reduce NPLs by finding their determinants; see e.g. Vithes-
sonthi (2016), Louzis et al. (2012), and Ghosh (2015).
The present article follows the strand of the first issue. The novelty is that we incorporate 
the second issue into bank efficiency analysis. When evaluating bank efficiency, “data 
envelopment analysis” (DEA) is considered a suitable and commonly used approach 
(Fethi, Pasiouras 2010; Luo 2003). This is especially true when NPLs are considered, 
because DEA can easily accommodate both multiple inputs and multiple outputs. In 
DEA literature, NPLs are termed undesirable outputs, being distinguished from stand-
ard outputs. From the viewpoint of efficiency evaluations, given a specific amount of 
inputs, the more standard outputs are produced, the more efficient a production unit is. 
Yet producing fewer undesirable outputs is better. Most existing bank efficiency works 
that considered NPLs just focused on the issue of efficiency and productivity analysis; 
see e.g. Zhu et al. (2015). To our knowledge, no studies have been conducted in the 
literature so far to address the problem of NPL reduction by using DEA.
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However, a few studies that use parametric approaches to explore the effect of NPLs 
on bank efficiency can also deal with the problem of NPL reduction in a different way. 
Pastor and Serrano (2005) measure a ratio between the minimum NPLs and observed 
NPLs, called risk management efficiency, with which one can evaluate by how much a 
bank should decrease NPLs to be efficient. Maggi and Guida (2011) estimate the cost 
function for Italian banks, and calculate the NPL impact on the operating cost. They 
represent the link between loans and NPLs by stressing the role of the geographical 
position of the bank, and gauge such geographical differences as extremely relevant to 
the possibility of controlling costs by reducing the level of loans and NPLs according 
to the performance of the different areas. Instead of using parametric approaches, the 
present paper applies non-parametric DEA approaches, which do not require any defini-
tions to be made about a specific form of an underlying production function. Besides, 
the proposed approach can measure both the industry-level and bank-level performance 
of controlling NPLs, and disaggregate the industry-wide reduction target into the aim of 
each bank, which earlier studies using parametric approaches did not consider.
As such, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature by suggesting a 
newly developed DEA model for deriving a NPL reduction plan that improves industry 
efficiency most. We present and compare four NPL reduction plans, including (1) reduc-
tion according to a given rate of decrease, (2) reduction according to the efficiency with 
which a bank controls NPLs, (3) reduction according to a mixed strategy combining the 
first two, and (4) reduction suggested from the proposed DEA model to maximize the 
industry-wide efficiency of controlling NPLs. We use a dataset collected from Taiwan’s 
banking industry to conduct an empirical study. The main finding is that Plan 4 can help 
identify a finite number of key banks to improve system efficiency most.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. The next section discusses the existing 
DEA-based approaches for the reduction of undesirable outputs. Section 2 introduces 
the methodological issues and explains the details of the suggested reduction plans. 
Section 3 presents the data. In Sections 4 and 5, the empirical findings are presented 
and discussed.
1. DEA models for controlling undesirable outputs: a brief review
Our proposed models are based on a DEA-like approach. Before introducing the pro-
posed models, it is necessary to explain where the suggested approach is grounded in 
the literature. As mentioned earlier, although there have been a large number of DEA 
publications involving empirical research on the banking industry, most of them have 
been published in the field of efficiency and productivity analysis. None have conducted 
studies on the reduction of NPLs. However, a few DEA studies have addressed the is-
sue of allocating a reduction target of pollutants or greenhouse gas emissions among 
decision-making units (DMUs), which are also termed undesirable outputs.
Wu et al. (2013) introduce a bargaining game into a centralized DEA model so that 
DMUs compete with each other for the least reduction of emission permits. In doing 
so, the central authority can improve the overall efficiency by reallocating the remain-
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ing emission permits. The proposed approach is applied to a dataset of agricultural 
greenhouse gas emissions from 15 European Union members. Sun et al. (2014) discuss 
two mechanisms for the reduction of emission permits among a group of manufactur-
ing companies. The first one supposes that one of the member firms dominates the al-
location on behalf of the group, and the second one assumes that a central authority is 
responsible for coordinating the allocation among all group members. The result shows 
that the second mechanism, which can not only maximize the whole efficiency of the 
group but also improve efficiencies of individual firms, is a better choice than the first 
one.
Feng et al. (2015), however, argue that a centralized allocation plan suffers from an 
implementation difficulty in persuading DMUs to reach agreement. They propose a 
two-step method to mitigate this side effect. In the first step, they provide improved 
DEA-based centralized allocation models, and in the second step, two compensation 
schemes are developed for centralized allocation for carbon emission abatement across 
countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Wu et al. 
(2016b) incorporate DEA and its closest target technique into a carbon emission abate-
ment allocation problem. First, they propose a two-stage optimal total abatement target 
identification approach, which is used to obtain the optimal total abatement level for the 
DMUs. Then, another two-stage approach is developed for allocating the optimal total 
abatement among the DMUs. Wu et al. (2016a) suggest a context-dependent DEA tech-
nique, which maximizes output revenue after the total reduced carbon dioxide emissions 
and energy intensity, to allocate national carbon dioxide emissions and energy intensity 
reduction targets over Chinese provincial industrial sectors.
Another series of studies employ zero sum gains DEA models to “reallocate” emission 
permits or pollutant emissions. Note that a zero-sum game or a reallocation plan means 
that the total undesirable outputs remain unchanged, rather than reduced, after alloca-
tion. However, we believe that after appropriate revision the models can also be applied 
to allocate reduction targets over DMUs. Gomes and Lins (2008) are the first apply-
ing the models. They evaluate a carbon dioxide emission reallocation scheme between 
non-Annex I and Annex I parties, which can be considered part of the Kyoto Protocol 
statement. For more related studies, see Pang et al. (2015) and Chiu et al. (2015).
The above brief review shows that, as we have noted earlier, no DEA studies have 
addressed the problem of NPL reduction. Previous studies just focused on one type of 
undesirable outputs–pollutants. And the proposed DEA-like approaches could be clas-
sified into two categories: centralized DEA and zero sum gains DEA. The suggested 
approaches either emphasize that a central agency vigorously intervenes in the alloca-
tion of reduction or introduce negotiation mechanisms for the allocation of reduction. 
Both the proposed models are mainly applied to deal with emission abatements between 
countries. Neither of them has developed schemes from the viewpoint of maximizing in-
dustry efficiency. In the banking industry, it is important to control NPLs from the view-
point of the industry. As argued by Scardovi (2016), banks may not possess the skills 
necessary to develop a strategy that takes into account an industry-wide perspective. In 
the present article, we have considered this perspective by introducing new approaches.
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2. Methodological issues and plans for the reduction of undesirable outputs
2.1. Measuring the efficiency of controlling undesirable outputs
The proposed approaches aim at developing the best plan for the reduction of NPLs. 
Before introducing the suggested models, it is necessary to clarify how the best plan is 
defined. Since the central topic is to deal with NPLs, naturally the measurement of how 
efficiently NPLs are controlled would be an ideal index, and a plan that can maximize 
the index would be the best.
Assume that the banking industry evaluated is composed of n = 1,…,N banks or DMUs. 
Each consumes inputs 1, ,… Ix x  to produce outputs 1, ,… Jy y , and in the process NPLs 
occur, which are considered undesirable outputs. To generalize the proposed models, 
assume that there are 1, ,… Kb b  undesirable outputs. Let xin, yjn and bkn respectively 
denote the ith input, the jth output and the kth undesirable output of DMU n.
We use the concept of “sub-vector efficiency” (Frija et al. 2009; Pang et al. 2015), 
which is introduced to account for undesirable output dimensions only, to measure the 
efficiency of controlling undesirable outputs, i.e. the efficiency of controlling NPLs 
(E-NPL) in our case. The efficiency measure is basically similar to traditional radial 
measures. The general specification for evaluating E-NPL of DMU o∈{1,…, N} is as 
follows:
                                    Min q                                                                   (1.1)
                                    s.t. 
1
,  1, ,  
=




x x i I; (1.2)
1
, 1, , 
=




y y j J;                                    (1.3)
1
,  1, ,  
=












;                                                         (1.5)
0, 1, , ,l ≥ = …n n N ;                                             (1.6)
q is unconstrained in sign,                                   (1.7)
where q is a shrinkage factor with a boundary between one and zero for the undesirable 
outputs, namely the measure of E-NPL in our case. q < 1 shows a technically inefficient 
DMU because there exist undesirable output shrinkages. q = 1 shows a technically ef-
ficient DMU because of no undesirable output shrinkages. A more illuminating exposi-
tion of the measure can be found when Model (1) is rewritten as a dual form, which 
we will explain later. l are non-negative weights that define the target operation unit as 
a linear combination of the sample observations. (1.5) is a convexity constraint, which 
allows the production technology to display variable returns to scale. Without this con-
straint, the production technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, which 
indicates that DMUs are operating at their optimal scale. Because there is no evidence 
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to show that the banks under evaluation in this study are at their optimal scale, the 
underlying technologies are assumed to be variable returns to scale.
Another way that Model (1) is different from traditional models is that it includes unde-
sirable outputs. In DEA literature, however, there has been so far no general agreement 
on modeling undesirable outputs in a model; for a discussion on this matter see, e.g., 
Liu et al. (2010). Before a general conclusion is reached, we consider all existing ap-
proaches to be valid. When measuring E-NPL, if outputs are given, a DMU producing 
fewer undesirable outputs is considered more efficient, and so is using fewer inputs. 
Therefore, many studies (e.g. Zhang 2008) treat undesirable outputs as inputs. Both 
inputs and undesirable outputs are something that is given, needed, or lost in order to 
get a particular desirable output. For a bank, issuing riskier loans and using more inputs 
should produce more revenue and gains, yet riskier loans are frequently accompanied 
by NPLs. Thus, in a service process of commercial banks, NPLs are treated as inputs 
(Pasiouras 2008).
Model (1) is used to measure E-NPL at the DMU level. What about the E-NPL at the 
“industry” level? To address this question, we modify the approach suggested by Ray 
and Hu (1997) to develop the desired model. Since the banking industry is made up of 
individual banks, let the industry’s inputs, outputs and undesirable outputs be denoted 


















B b ,  1, ,  = …k K .                                     (4)
A DEA model typically consists of two parts, the production possibility set and the 
evaluated point. As shown in Model (1), the observed data ( , , )io jo kox y b  are placed on 
the right-hand sides of the constraints (1.2)–(1.4), and the production frontier is formu-
lated as the left-hand sides of the same constraints. The scale of an industry on average 
is N times as large as an individual bank, so the industry’s production possibility set 
would be expanded outward N times more than those of (1.2)–(1.4). Let η = ln nN , and 
replace ( , , )io jo kox y b  with ( , , )i j kX Y B . The model measuring industry-level E-NPL is 
as follows:
                                Min  q                                                                      (5.1)
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η =∑ ;                                                           (5.5)
0, 1, , ,η ≥ = …n n N                                                (5.6)
 q is unconstrained in sign.                                      (5.7)
We now turn to the issue of the reduction of undesirable outputs. Suppose that the 
industry wants to reduce undesirable outputs by akbk, where ak is a reduction rate of 
the kth undesirable output, 0 1< a <k . Then the next question is how much each DMU 
should reduce undesirable outputs. We suggest using the following formula to derive 
possible plans.






 − q  a − b




B , n 1, , = … N ; 1, ,  ,= …k K  (6)
where dkn denotes the reduction of the kth undesirable output of DMU n, and q* is 
DMUs’ E-NPL before reduction. Specifically, formula (6) divides ak into two parts, 
bk and ak – bk, where bk is a plan parameter, b ≤ ak k . Defining bk with different 
numerical values, various reduction plans are suggested. We further define a DMU’s 
responsibility of reduction as consisting of two parts accordingly. The first part, bk knb  , 
delimits a given responsibility for each DMU according to its own NPLs. The more 
NPLs a DMU produces, the more reduction it should undertake. The second part, 
( )( )* *
1
1  / (1 )
=
− q a − b − q∑
N
n k k k o
o
B , assigns a share of responsibility for each DMU ac-
cording to the entire industry’s NPLs and how inefficiently the DMU controls NPLs be-
fore reduction. The more inefficient a DMU is, the more reduction it should undertake.
2.2. Plan 1
Let b = ak k . Then (6) becomes
 knd = ak knb , n 1, , = … N ; 1, ,  .= …k K  (7)
The plan simply suggests that each DMU should reduce its undesirable outputs by akbk. 
Because for every DMU and the industry, the reduction rate is the same, this would be 
considered fair.
2.3. Plan 2
One may argue that, however, Plan 1 is not truly fair, because an efficient DMU and 
an inefficient DMU assume the same reduction responsibility. To consider efficiency 







 − q a




B , n 1, , = … N ; 1, ,  .= …k K  (8)
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This plan suggests that a “relatively” efficient DMU does not need to assume any reduc-
tion responsibility. And the more inefficient a DMU is, the more reduction it should un-
dertake. From the viewpoint of individual efficiency, the plan seems fairer than Plan 1.
2.4. Plan 3
It should be noted that the efficiency scores derived from DEA models are based on the 
concept of relative efficiency, rather than absolute efficiency. For a relatively efficient 
DMU, it is still possible to reduce its undesirable outputs. This implies that Plan 2 would 
be impractical. As such, an alternative scheme is to combine Plans 1 and 2.
Let 0 < b < ak k . Then giving bk an arbitrary value within the range, a third plan can 
be defined.
2.5. Plan 4
We suppose that Plans 1–3 could not be the best plan that we defined earlier. The best 
plan must be able to maximize industry-level E-NPL. In what follows we will extend 




− − d∑ ∑
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                             d is unconstrained in sign,                                               (9.5)
where , ,j iu v  and sk are unknown weights attached to outputs, inputs, and undesirable 
outputs, respectively, e is a non-Archimedean constant, and d is a variable that allows 
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, , 0≥ e >j i ku v s , 1, , ; 1, , ; 1, , ,= … = … = …i I j J k K;                  (10.3)
    d is unconstrained in sign.                                                    (10.4)
According to the duality property, the optimal values of the objective functions for Mod-
els (5), (9), and (10), i.e. the efficiency measure, are the same, but Model (10) provides 
a more illuminating exposition of the measure. The efficiency of controlling undesirable 
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outputs can be defined as a maximum ratio of net production, weighted outputs minus 
weighted inputs, to weighted undesirable outputs.
Instead of using Eq. (6), we modify Model (9) to determine dkn because the solution of 
a linear programming problem is an optimal one picked from numerous feasible ones. 
From a theoretical point of view, Plans 1–3 could be some of the possible solutions of 
the following programming model, but only the plan derived from the model is optimal. 
However, Plans 1–3 may be applied in practice, and provide a contrast to the best plan 
so as to facilitate the understanding of its merits.
We modify Model (9) as follows to determine Plan 4:
 Max  
1 1= =
− − d∑ ∑
J I
j j i i
j i
ax u Y v X NＭ                                                      (11.1)








s B ;                                                               (11.2)
1 1 1
( ) 0,  1, ,  ,
= = =
− − − − d ≤ = …∑ ∑ ∑
J I K
j jn i in k kn kn
j i k
u y v x s b d n N ;              (11.3)
1
, 1, , ,
=




d B k K;                                                      (11.4)
0, 1, , ; 1, ,  ,− > = … = …kn knb d k K n N ;                                        (11.5)
( )*1 , 1, , ; 1, ,  ,≤ − q + a = … = …kn n k knd b k K n N ;                           (11.6)
, , 0≥ e >j i ku v s , 1, , ; 1, , ; 1, , ,= … = … = …i I j J k K;                       (11.7)
0, 1, , ; 1, ,  ,≥ = … = …knd k K n N ;                                                (11.8)
d is unconstrained in sign.                                                       (11.9)
Note that in Model (11) DMUs’ reductions dkn are unknown decision variables. Con-
straint (11.4) shows that the sum of DMUs’ reductions is equal to the industry-wide 
reduction. (11.5) is added to avoid the situation that any DMU’s reduction is larger than 
its original volume. Constraint (11.6), where *qn  are DMUs’ E-NPL before reduction, is 
added to keep the features of formulas (6)–(8). The constraint sets a maximal value of 
reduction; the more inefficient before reduction a DMU is, the larger value it is given. 
The maximal reduction for an efficient DMU is ak knb .
Model (11) is non-linear. Let =kn k knt s d . It can be rewritten as the following linear 
form:
              
Max
 1 1= =
− − d∑ ∑
J I
j j i i
j i
ax u Y v X NＭ
                                                           
(12.1)








s B ;                                                             (12.2)
1 1 1
( ) 0,  1, ,  ,
= = =
− − − − d ≤ = …∑ ∑ ∑
J I K
j jn i in k kn nk
j i k
u y v x s b t n N ;              (12.3)
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1
, 1, , ,
=
= a = …∑
N
kn k k k
n
t s B k K ;                                                  (12.4)
0− >k kn kns b t ,  1, , , 1, ,  ,= … = …k K n N ;                                  (12.5)
( )*1 , 1, , ; 1, ,  ,≤ − q + a = … = …kn n k k knt s b k K n N ;                       (12.6)
, , 0≥ e >j i ku v s , 1, , ; 1, , ; 1, , ,= … = … = …i I j J k K;                      (12.7)
0≥knt ,  1, , , 1, ,  = … = …k K n N ,                                            (12.8)
d is unconstrained in sign.                                                    (12.9)
Using Model (12), we can find optimal values of *nkt  and *ks . Let * */=kn kn kd t s . The 
best reduction plan maximizing industry-wide E-NPL can then be found.
3. Data
The four reduction plans have been computed using data for Taiwan’s banking industry. 
Controlling NPLs has long been an issue in Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, Taiwan’s 
authorities have relaxed regulations and restrictions in exchange for greater participation 
of private entities. In the banking industry, the liberalization stimulated the development 
of the financial markets but also encouraged aggressive banking practices. A large num-
ber of new banks often engaged in unsound business practices in order to expand their 
market share. As a result, Taiwan’s banking system suffered from an increase in NPLs 
and a number of financially troubled banks (Yang 2014).
In conducting the proposed models, the first step is the determination of inputs and 
outputs in banking service. However, in DEA literature, the selection of the inputs and 
outputs is typically different (Paradi, Zhu 2013). To identify the inputs and outputs, 
two approaches are commonly used: the production approach and the intermediation 
approach. In the production approach, a bank is considered to be a firm using its staff, 
equipment, floor space, etc. to serve its clients, and eventually attracting different types 
of deposit and loan accounts. Under the intermediation approach, banks are thought of 
as a financial intermediary between savers and borrowers. One of the most significant 
differences between the two approaches is the classification of deposits. The produc-
tion approach regards deposits as outputs, while the intermediation approach considers 
deposits to be inputs (Holod, Lewis 2011; Paradi, Zhu 2013). Because the goal of reduc-
ing NPLs is to address the problem between lenders and borrowers, the intermediation 
approach is adopted for our case.
The intermediation approach generally posits that deposits, along with labor and physi-
cal capital, are inputs, whereas loans and securities are outputs. Yet, granting loans and 
investing in securities are expected to generate revenue in the end. Therefore, the output 
used in this study includes revenue and gains (y). The inputs include personnel expenses 
(x1), fixed assets (x2), and deposits (x3). NPLs are the by-product of the intermediation 
process, and are regarded as an undesirable output (b).
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Taiwan’s banking industry currently includes 37 banks. Although Taiwan’s authorities 
have relaxed restrictions on the financial sector, the banking industry is regulated by the 
Financial Supervisory Commission, which is responsible for the development, supervi-
sion, regulation, and examination of financial markets and financial service enterprises. 
The proposed DEA models are suitable for the case study because they are developed 
from the viewpoint of the industry-wide development authority or the regulator. We 
have collected the input and output data from the public information system on the of-
ficial website of the Financial Supervisory Commission. The data were annual informa-
tion reported for the year 2015. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the input 
and output variables.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs
Inputs/outputs Mean Std. dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Personnel expenses (x1) 5,799 4,760 389 19,814 1.024 0.506
Fixed assets (x2) 13,347 18,073 555 96,728 3.089 12.245
Deposits (x3) 933,367 886,416 62,550 3,838,479 1.318 1.608
Revenue and gains (y) 55,673 63,965 1,444 308,051 2.185 5.955
NPLs (b) 1,602 1,626 37 6,805 1.652 2.499
Notes: Inputs and outputs are in millions of NT dollars.
4. Empirical results
Models (1) and (5) have been used to compute bank-level E-NPL and industry-level E-
NPL respectively. The results are listed in column 3, Table 2. The computed E-NPL is 
much lower than we expected. Although 10 banks are relatively efficient in controlling 
NPLs, the industry-level E-NPL is only 0.301. This is because inefficient banks’ E-NPL 
is extremely low; most of them have a score less than 0.4 (see Fig. 1, the distribution of 
E-NPL scores). Since the industry-level E-NPL is only 0.301, it is indeed necessary to 
reduce NPLs in the industry, and the decrease should be massive. Otherwise, efficiency 
improvement would be insignificant. Figure 1 also shows that banks’ E-NPL scores have 
a bimodal distribution, with some clustered to the efficient end, but with over half be-
ing highly inefficient. Intuitively, in this case, one may suggest that the NPL reduction 
should aim at low E-NPL banks. That is exactly what Plan 2 suggests.
To investigate the suggestion, we conduct a scenario analysis of reducing industry-wide 
NPLs by 20%; namely the parameter a is given by 0.2. All four reduction plans have 
been computed. Unfortunately, we find that Plan 2 is infeasible. In viewing Eq. (8), one 
can see that if a bank’s E-NPL is extremely low and the reduction parameter is given 
with a larger figure, the bank’s reduction volume would be considerable. For a bank 
with modest original NPLs, the reduction target would exceed its original outputs, and 
as a result this is infeasible. The original NPLs of the sample banks are listed in col-
umn 2, Table 2. Take, for instance, Bank 23. Its original NPLs are 175. According to 
Eq. (8), its reduction target is 306, which is infeasible.
844
C.-C. Yang. Reduction of non-performing loans in the banking industry: an application of data ...
Table 2. Scenario of reducing NPLs by 20%
Bank Original Plan 1 Plan 3* Plan 4
NPLs E-NPL reduction E-NPL reduction E-NPL reduction E-NPL
1 5603 1.000 1121 1.000 784 1.000 0 1.000
2 3320 0.133 664 0.133 623 0.137 0 0.133
3 6805 0.113 1361 0.113 1115 0.116 6040 1.000
4 2761 0.378 552 0.378 500 0.397 0 0.364
5 3070 0.201 614 0.201 576 0.212 0 0.201
6 2843 0.189 569 0.189 547 0.198 0 0.189
7 1548 0.228 310 0.229 358 0.244 0 0.228
8 1795 1.000 359 1.000 251 1.000 0 1.000
9 1599 1.000 320 1.000 224 1.000 0 1.000
10 808 0.046 162 0.046 288 0.059 0 0.046
11 1341 0.502 268 0.501 279 0.543 0 0.501
12 1096 0.222 219 0.222 296 0.262 0 0.218
13 175 1.000 35 1.000 25 1.000 35 1.000
14 358 0.252 72 0.253 187 0.455 0 0.243
15 4905 0.055 981 0.055 860 0.053 0 0.055
16 1084 0.121 217 0.121 313 0.135 0 0.120
17 1318 0.059 264 0.060 357 0.047 0 0.059
18 37 1.000 7 1.000 5 1.000 0 1.000
19 129 1.000 26 1.000 18 1.000 0 1.000
20 64 1.000 13 1.000 9 1.000 13 1.000
21 341 0.350 68 0.350 167 0.591 0 0.291
22 935 0.402 187 0.402 240 0.449 0 0.402
23 175 0.211 35 0.214 169 1.000 0 0.211
24 957 0.039 191 0.039 310 0.045 0 0.039
25 229 0.447 46 0.447 133 0.919 172 1.000
26 152 0.569 30 0.570 100 1.000 32 0.718
27 853 0.273 171 0.273 253 0.334 628 1.000
28 884 1.000 177 1.000 124 1.000 177 1.000
29 2143 0.339 429 0.338 421 0.362 1418 1.000
30 1350 0.612 270 0.611 260 0.652 534 0.999
31 753 1.000 151 1.000 105 1.000 0 1.000
32 1655 0.075 331 0.075 401 0.085 0 0.066
33 1138 0.657 228 0.657 222 0.702 0 0.656
34 593 0.331 119 0.332 205 0.436 0 0.327
35 290 0.198 58 0.200 187 0.467 232 1.000
36 1791 1.000 358 1.000 251 1.000 0 1.000
37 4372 0.577 874 0.577 689 0.589 2573 1.000
industry 59270 0.301 11854 0.301 11854 0.317 11854 0.376
Notes: * The computed results of Plan 3 are based on b = 0.14.
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We turn to Plan 3, which partially preserves the feature of Plan 2. Because Plan 2 is 
defined by letting b = 0, we assign b a new figure as small as possible. However, the 
plans are also not feasible until b = 0.14. The resulting reduction for each bank is listed 
in column 6. Then computing each bank’s NPLs after reduction and rerunning Mod-
els (1) and (5), we can find new bank-level and industry-level E-NPL when the plan 
is carried out. The results are listed in column 7. The outcomes show that almost all 
inefficient banks’ E-NPL is improved, with the exception of Banks 15 and 17; efficient 
banks remain efficient, and industry-level E-NPL is improved as well, from 0.301 to 
0.317. However, the extent of improvement is smaller than expected. In a traditional 
DEA model using a radial input-oriented measure, if an inefficient DMU’s inputs are 
reduced by 20%, the efficiency score would be expected to increase 0.2. The unexpected 
results can be explained by the structure of Model (1). In the model, when reduction is 
carried out, all bank’s NPLs are changed. Thus both sides of the inequality (1.4) would 
be changed as well, possibly to the same direction. This would lead to less significant 
efficiency improvement. However, in a traditional model, reducing an inefficient DMU’s 
undesirable outputs cannot change the left-hand side of the inequality, but will make the 
observed point closer to the frontier, leading to more significant efficiency improvement.
The phenomenon can be seen more clearly in Plan 1. Using this plan, each bank’s re-
duction is listed in column 4. After reduction, bank-level and industry-level E-NPL are 
listed in column 5. One can see that banks’ E-NPL is almost the same as that before 
reduction, and industry-level E-NPL stays at 0.301. In other words, the plan cannot im-
prove industry-wide efficiency at all. The results show the limitation of applying a DEA 
model, since its resulting efficiency is a “relative” concept. When all banks’ NPLs are 
reduced by the same rate, highly efficient banks remain highly efficient, and vice versa. 
To improve relative efficiency, highly efficient banks should produce more NPLs, while 
inefficient banks should reduce NPLs. For efficient banks, this does not make sense. Or 
one may suggest that the reduction should focus only on inefficient banks. Yet, that is 
exactly the idea of Plan 2, which we have shown to be infeasible above. Therefore, we 
suggest another one, Plan 4.
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Model (12) is used to compute each bank’s reduction. The results are listed in column 8. 
Again, we compute each bank’s NPLs after reduction and then rerun Models (1). The 
resulting E-NPL is listed in column 9. As for industry-level E-NPL, Model (12) has 
calculated it, or one can rerun Model (5). The results are the same. Through this plan, 
industry-level E-NPL increases to 0.376, larger than the E-NPL derived from Plans 1 
and 3. This is not surprising. As said earlier, the resulting industry-level E-NPL based 
on this plan is the largest when giving a reduction target. Only 11 banks are assigned 
the task of reduction. One may expect that these should be the least efficient banks. To 
our surprise, many extremely inefficient banks, e.g. Banks 10, 15, 17, 24, and 32, are 
not assigned this task. From a methodological perspective, Plan 4 tries to find a scheme 
maximizing the ratio of net production (weighted outputs minus weighted inputs) to 
NPLs at the industry level, which is possibly more sensitive to big banks. We find that 
those which are not assigned the task of reduction are mostly small banks. The focus 
is that once a bank is chosen to perform reduction, the reduction would eventually 
make them become efficient. Besides, an odd result is that a few efficient banks are 
also assigned the reduction task, but after reduction, they are still efficient. This may be 
because the production frontier must be adjusted, so the industry-wide efficiency can 
be maximized. Moreover, efficient banks’ reduction is relatively modest compared to 
inefficient ones; see Banks 13, 20, and 28. One of the reasons is that we have added a 
constraint, i.e. the inequality (11.6), to make a reduction distinction between efficient 
and inefficient banks.
To confirm the above empirical findings, we conduct another scenario analysis of reduc-
ing the whole industry’s NPLs by 40%. The results are shown in Table 3. Using Plan 1, 
again, both bank-level and industry-level E-NPL scores are almost the same as their 
original levels. As for Plan 2, due to a larger amount of reduction, it is only natural that 
the reduction is infeasible. To employ Plan 3, the parameter b must be at least 0.36. 
The results are listed in columns 6 and 7. Similar to the results of a 20% reduction, 
the plan can improve E-NPL more than Plan 1. However, the resulting E-NPL is very 
close to that of the scenario of reducing 20%. Possible reasons are that because b is 
given by 0.36, very close to a = 0.4, its effect upon efficiency improvement is, as a 
result, similar to Plan 1. Therefore, even though the amount of reduction is larger, the 
improvement effect is very close to that of the scenario of reducing 20%. If conducting 
Plan 4, industry-level E-NPL increases to 0.501, again, larger than the results of Plans 1 
and 3. To carry out the plan, only 20 banks are needed. And after reduction, almost all 
these banks will become efficient.
As noted in the introduction section, many previous studies have explored the role of 
NPLs in efficiency analysis, and found that NPLs have a negative effect on efficiency 
(Mester 1996; Berger, DeYoung 1997). The argument suggests that the reduction of 
NPLs can improve a bank’s efficiency. Our empirical results agree with this in general. 
But we have investigated more from a different point of view and obtained following 
two important cautions when applying the argument. First, past studies mostly explored 
how NPLs will impact bank efficiency from an individual point of view. The present 
article, on the other hand, explored how the reduction of NPLs will affect individual 
847
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2017, 18(5): 833–851
Table 3. Scenario of reducing NPLs by 40%
Bank
Original Plan 1 Plan 3* Plan 4
NPLs E-NPL Reduction E-NPL Reduction E-NPL Reduction E-NPL
1 5603 1.000 2241 1.000 2017 1.000 0 1.000
2 3320 0.133 1328 0.133 1301 0.138 0 0.133
3 6805 0.113 2722 0.113 2558 0.116 6040 1.000
4 2761 0.378 1104 0.378 1070 0.395 0 0.364
5 3070 0.201 1228 0.201 1203 0.211 2452 1.000
6 2843 0.189 1137 0.189 1122 0.198 387 0.219
7 1548 0.228 619 0.228 651 0.245 0 0.228
8 1795 1.000 718 1.000 646 1.000 0 1.000
9 1599 1.000 640 1.000 576 1.000 0 1.000
10 808 0.046 323 0.045 407 0.059 0 0.022
11 1341 0.502 536 0.502 544 0.539 668 0.999
12 1096 0.222 438 0.221 490 0.257 857 0.999
13 175 1.000 70 1.000 63 1.000 70 1.000
14 358 0.252 143 0.251 220 0.420 0 0.235
15 4905 0.055 1962 0.055 1881 0.054 4637 0.997
16 1084 0.121 434 0.121 498 0.136 953 0.996
17 1318 0.059 527 0.059 589 0.056 1240 0.997
18 37 1.000 15 1.000 13 1.000 0 1.000
19 129 1.000 52 1.000 46 1.000 31 1.000
20 64 1.000 26 1.000 23 1.000 26 1.000
21 341 0.350 136 0.348 202 0.550 0 0.219
22 935 0.402 374 0.402 410 0.449 0 0.402
23 175 0.211 70 0.210 159 1.000 146 1.000
24 957 0.039 383 0.038 462 0.047 0 0.021
25 229 0.447 92 0.447 150 0.831 218 1.000
26 152 0.569 61 0.569 107 1.000 0 0.567
27 853 0.273 341 0.273 396 0.327 628 0.998
28 884 1.000 354 1.000 318 1.000 192 1.000
29 2143 0.339 857 0.339 852 0.359 1418 1.000
30 1350 0.612 540 0.612 533 0.647 534 0.999
31 753 1.000 301 1.000 271 1.000 0 1.000
32 1655 0.075 662 0.075 709 0.084 0 0.043
33 1138 0.657 455 0.657 452 0.697 0 0.656
34 593 0.331 237 0.330 295 0.423 405 1.000
35 290 0.198 116 0.197 202 0.415 233 1.000
36 1791 1.000 716 1.000 645 1.000 0 1.000
37 4372 0.577 1749 0.577 1626 0.588 2573 1.000
industry 59270 0.301 23708 0.301 23708 0.317 23708 0.501
Notes: * The computed results of Plan 3 are based on b = 0.36.
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banks’ and the whole bank system’s efficiency from an industry-wide point of view. 
From the industry-wide perspective, if all banks reduce their NPLs by the same ratio, 
the above argument is no longer true. More specifically, in this case, the relative ef-
ficiency of individual banks and the whole system is almost the same as their original 
level. Second, even though the reduction of NPLs is generally helpful in improving 
industry-wide efficiency, an incorrect reduction plan could make the improvement very 
insignificant, for example, again, reducing all banks’ NPLs by the same ratio.
5. Discussion and implications
Over the last three decades, many economies, including Taiwan, have adopted financial 
reforms aimed at eliminating different restrictions on the financial sector. However, the 
financial liberalization may lead to banking crises. One of these crises is the increase in 
NPLs. To control NPLs and other financial risks, banking systems are still regarded as 
a regulated industry. For the regulator, the benefit of this study is to help evaluate pos-
sible NPL reduction plans. We introduce DEA efficiency estimates, the measure of net 
production per NPL ratio, to help evaluate NPL reduction plans. Using the measure, the 
regulator can identify the most efficient plan. Among the possible schemes, we compare 
four plans. Based on the above scenario analysis, we recommend Plan 4. The plan can 
improve industry-wide efficiency most. Moreover, different from Plans 1 and 3, the plan 
just focuses on a finite number of banks, helping identify the key units to improve. This 
may lower the expenses of reduction. In addition, focusing on limited units can also 
enable us to implement the reduction plan more easily.
The implications behind the empirical results are that the regulator should devise more 
incentive measures to control NPLs. Generally, however, regulatory authorities, in-
cluding Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission, use punitive sanctions to control 
NPLs. For example, according to Taiwan’s banking act, if a bank’s NPL ratio exceeds 
5%, the authority will adopt punitive measures such as issuing an NPL improvement 
order, restriction on distributions of remuneration to directors and supervisors, restric-
tion on distributions of surplus etc. Punitive sanctions are passive. For those whose NPL 
ratio does not exceed 5%, the measures lack incentives to motivate them to improve. 
The implementation of Plan 4, however, requires incentive measures because the target 
bank’s original E-NPL may not be very inefficient.
Besides efficiency, another important issue is what the consequences of the plans with 
the stability of the financial system are. The suggested approach cannot address this is-
sue in its present form. However, after appropriate revision, we believe that the models 
can deal with the problem. The key point is to identify the position where the NPLs are 
riskier, that is, to identify each bank’s ability to absorb NPL losses. Then, by dividing 
banks into several groups according to their ability and revising Model (11) to restrict 
different reduction targets for each group, we believe that the resulting reduction plan 
can achieve both stability and efficiency.
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Summary and conclusions
Increased NPLs have been a significant problem in many countries all over the world. 
The present paper has suggested a DEA-based approach for disaggregating an industry-
wide NPL reduction target into the aim of each bank so as to maximize banking system 
efficiency. For comparison, three other plans are also represented. Using a data set from 
Taiwan’s banking industry, the empirical findings have showed that the proposed models 
can suggest a most efficient reduction plan; the plan focuses on improvement of a finite 
number of banks, which can be implemented more easily and could possibly lower the 
expenses of reduction. Possible applications of the findings are that the regulator or 
policy maker should provide more incentives to control NPLs because the target banks 
may not be relatively inefficient. Forcing banks to cut their NPLs by the same ratio is 
not encouraged; it is not at all helpful to improve the relative efficiency of the banks and 
the industry. Therefore, the present article has successfully provided policy makers an 
effective quantization approach to develop an efficient NPL reduction scheme, helping 
address the NPL control problem.
Future studies could extend the proposed approaches in a more practical way. For ex-
ample, it may be more important to monitor a big bank than a small bank, because a 
big bank failure is more likely to produce a disastrous effect on the economy. Then, the 
question is how to incorporate the bank size variance into the model. It will be interest-
ing to see additional research to accommodate this variance. Or, for another example, 
a bankers’ association or regulatory agency may have funding for controlling NPLs. In 
such a case, future studies can explore how to fairly allocate the funding when designing 
a reduction plan. Finally, this paper only addresses the NPL reduction issue. There are 
many other risk factors affecting bank efficiency, e.g. the capital adequacy ratio. Another 
potential area for future research is to extend this study by covering more risk factors.
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